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THE DRESSMAKER’S DILEMMA:
SEXUAL ABUSE, CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE
CONVENTION FOR THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST MIGRANT WOMEN IN
JORDAN’S QUALIFIED INDUSTRIAL
ZONES
INTRODUCTION

O

n June 17, 2011, a twenty-six year-old Bangladeshi
woman, encouraged by the Institute for Global Labor and
Human Rights (“IGLHR”), a U.S.-based advocacy group, filed a
formal complaint with Jordanian authorities that she had been
raped by Classic Fashion Apparel (“Classic”) factory’s top manager, Anil Santha.1 Mr. Santha was arrested that month under
suspicion of raping the young woman three times since her arrival at the factory in March of 2011.2 Following the Bangladeshi woman’s complaint, several other female workers came
forward charging similar acts of sexual harassment and abuse
by Santha in 2010 and 2011 including one woman who had become pregnant from the assault.3 The controversy fueled worries about the future of the apparel manufacturing industry in

1. Miguel Bustillo, Sex Abuse Alleged at Apparel Maker, WALL ST. J.,
June 20, 2011, at B3.
2. Id.
3. Jamal Halaby, Jordan Rights Group: No Proof of Rape at Factory, THE
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
8,
2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9837153 [hereinafter No Proof of
Rape]. See INST. FOR GLOBAL LABOUR & HUMAN RIGHTS, SEXUAL PREDATORS
AND SERIAL RAPISTS RUN WILD AT WAL-MART SUPPLIER IN JORDAN 6–10 (2011)
PREDATORS],
available
at
[hereinafter
SEXUAL
http://www.globallabourrights.org/admin/reports/files/Content-Classic-0607final.pdf. The eighty-two page report, issued by the Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights (“IGLHR”), compiled a series of interviews with female guest workers at Classic Fashion in Al Hassan Industrial Estate. In the
interviews, the women described the systematic rape and torture of female
employees by workplace supervisors at the factory. Id. at 6–22.
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Jordan, since textile exports to the United States are a main
source of national revenue.4
Classic, which produces clothing for major U.S. retailers—
including Wal-Mart, Target, Macy’s, Kohl’s and Lands’ End—is
Jordan’s largest garment exporter. 5 With Classic having annual exports estimated at US$125 million, nearly 13% of Jordan’s
one billion dollar garment exports industry,6 Jordan has a large
stake in the success and continued performance of Classic’s
business relationship with U.S.-based corporations. Thus, it did
not come as a surprise when Jordanian investigators seemed
reluctant to look into the veracity of the Classic rape allegations, perhaps out of fear for the economic repercussions of validating the claims.7 Notably, Mr. Santha was not prosecuted;
rather, he fled to Sri Lanka, his native country, allegedly with
the assistance of the Jordanian Ministry of Labor.8
4. Janell Ross, Major American Brands Silent on Alleged Rights Abuses
at
Overseas
Factories,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(July
21,
2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/21/american-brands-abuses-factoriesjordan-labor-conditions_n_903995.html.
5. Jamal Halaby, Rape Case Involving Foreign Workers Turns Focus to
NEWS
(Sept.
7,
2011),
Jordan’s
Factory
Problems,
ARAB
http://www.arabnews.com/node/390209 [hereinafter Rape Case Turns Focus].
6. Id.
7. The Labor Ministry’s director of inspection and safety, Adnan Rababaa, told the Jordan Times shortly after the IGLHR report was issued that,
“[w]e formed an ad hoc committee comprising members of all concerned entities who have already started arbitrary interviews with the labourers in this
particular company in order to verify the accusations in the report;” however,
the committee’s findings have not yet been publicized. Jordan Probing Abuse
MIRROR
(June
13,
2011),
Claims,
DAILY
http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/11907-jordan-probing-abuse-claims.html.
Investigation of the situation by the National Center for Human Rights
(“NCHR”), a non-governmental rights group found “no information to support
the rape allegations,” alleging that there were contradictions in the victims’
testimonies. See No Proof of Rape, supra note 3. However, the NCHR did not
provide examples of the alleged contradictions or explain investigators’ suspicions of the women’s statements. Id. When a reporter from the Associated
Press visited Classic’s factory, supervisors from Classic, as well as Classic’s
owner and managing director Sanal Kumar, presented six women for interview with the reporter. See Rape Case Turns Focus, supra note 5. All six
women were roommates of the women who reported rape, and speaking under the constant watch of the factory supervisors, disclaimed any knowledge
of rape in the factory. Id.
8. Major Progress in Jordan! Accused Rapist Flees, Public Pressure Forces
(Aug.
31,
2011),
Investigation,
CHANGE.ORG
http://www.globallabourrights.org/press?id=0375.
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The case of Classic points to the difficulties of assessing liability for human rights abuses against women working as overseas contract workers (“OCW”) or guest workers within a multinational corporation (“MNC”) framework. While Jordan is invested in promoting corporate contracts within its borders, it
does not have a system of oversight to regulate the practices of
those MNCs that are complicit in labor and human rights violations.9 That both Mr. Santha and the woman who initially
came forward to report the rape have left Jordan, further illustrates the difficulties of preventing and managing abuses
among OCWs—a vulnerable population that is viewed as easily
replaceable. 10 Though the victims and perpetrators of sexual
abuse in the workplace may disappear, the problems Jordan
faces with regards to violations of female workers rights remain a salient issue.
Non-American foreigners own most of the factories in Jordan’s industrial zone and operate as subcontractors for
MNCs.11 This legal separation between factories and MNCs allows companies, such as Macy’s, Kohl’s, and Lands’ End, to argue they have no control or responsibility over the abuses that
occur within factories they do not own. Following the exposé of
sexual abuse at Classic, the companies withdrew their business
from the factory and wiped their hands clean of the situation.12
However, the seamstresses for whom abysmal work conditions,
sexual harassment, and physical abuse are a daily reality are
not aided by MNCs ceasing to do business with the factories

9. NAT’L LABOR COMM., U.S.-JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT DESCENDS
HUMAN TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE 1 (2006) [hereinafter
HUMAN TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE],
available
at
http://www.globallabourrights.org/admin/documents/files/Jordan_Report_05_
03.pdf.
10. LIN LEAN LIM ET AL., INT’L LABOUR ORG., PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION,
EXPLOITATION, AND ABUSE OF WOMEN MIGRANT WORKERS: AN INFORMATION
GUIDE, BOOKLET 1—INTRODUCTION: WHY THE FOCUS ON WOMEN
INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT WORKERS 9–28 (2003).
11. IBRAHIM SAIF, THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE QUALIFIED
INDUSTRIAL ZONES IN JORDAN 44 (2006); see also Ran Dagoni, China main ben(May
4,
2006),
eficiary
of
US-Israel-Jordan
QIZ,
GLOBES
www.globes.co.ilserveen/g;obes/docview.asp?did=1000088134.
12. Rape Case Turns Focus, supra note 5. “Days after news of the rape
allegations emerged, U.S. retailers Kohl’s, Macy’s and Lands’ End stopped
placing orders from Classic . . . . [W]ithin four weeks, Classic’s losses reached
US$10 million, or 8 percent of its annual exports.” Id.
INTO
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they rely on for employment.13 MNCs who employ sweatshop
type labor,14 such as Wal-Mart and Target, should not escape
liability for their complicity in the inhumane treatment administered therein; 15 the manufacturing plants would not be in
business were it not for MNC demand of their products. MNC
dependence on cheap labor to maintain high profits has engendered a business model that favors absolute output, without
regard for the quality of workers’ environment and supervision.16
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (“CEDAW” or “Convention”)17 along with its Optional
Protocol,18 gives countries the tools to improve the condition of
13. See Debra Cohen Maryanov, Sweatshop Liability: Corporate Codes of
Conduct and the Governance of Labor Standards in the International Supply
Chain, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 397, 412 (2010) (“Terminating the contract
sends a clear message [to suppliers] . . . but also risks hurting the workers
who may lose their jobs. Some labor organizations therefore recommend termination only when suppliers refuse to cooperate, and even then urge companies to seek alternative local suppliers to keep production in the country.”).
14. See BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR, http://www.businesshumanrights.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). The Business and Human
Rights Resource Center has tracked the human rights performance of over
5,000 corporations in over 180 countries. The Center has documented abuses
ranging from health and safety violations in the workplace, to discrimination,
and social and environmental degradation. A Brief Description, BUS. &
HUMAN
RIGHTS
RES.
CTR.,
http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Aboutus/Briefdescription (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).
15. HUMAN TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, supra note 9, at 61–67
(Walmart), 20–24 (Target).
16. Maryanov, supra note 13, at 424 (“MNCs profit from sweatshop conditions and cause investment injuries by using profits to perpetuate the arrangement with . . . monitoring systems that discourage involvement by
stakeholders to improve labor conditions.”). See also Does I v. Gap, Inc., No.
CV-01-0031, 2002 WL 1000068, at *3 (D.N. Mar. I. May 10, 2002) (concluding
that “the plaintiffs have properly alleged an association-in-fact enterprise
consisting of individual retailers and individual manufacturers” by alleging
that the retailers used their collective “power through contracts, oversight,
and economic pressure,” to require garment manufacturers to continue unlawful policies and practices that perpetuated sweatshop conditions in textile
plants).
17. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women [CEDAW], G.A. Res. 34/180, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec.
18, 1979).
18. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4
(Oct. 15, 1999) [hereinafter CEDAW Optional Protocol]. For the history and
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women in society. Jordan ratified almost all the provisions of
the CEDAW in 1992; however, it did not adopt the Optional
Protocol.19 The Optional Protocol would have given victims an
additional complaint mechanism before the CEDAW Committee for claims alleging a violation of any of the rights set forth
in the Convention.20 So, women suffering from workplace abuse
are constrained to seeking help from factory personnel, nonprofit organizations, or Jordanian law enforcement and officials. It is therefore imperative that Jordan create a system of
law and order that will address the root causes of violence
against women in the workplace.
Jordan’s current administration of the Convention,21 through
the criminal prosecution of individual sex crimes, fails to prodetailed analysis of the Optional Protocol, see Felip Gomez Isa, The Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women: Strengthening the Protection Mechanisms of Women’s Human Rights, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 291, 305–20 (2003).
19. Status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscrimiTREATY
COLLECTION,
nation
Against
Women,
U.N.
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) [hereinafter CEDAW Status]. Jordan ratified the CEDAW on July 1, 1992. Id. Pursuant to Jordanian
law, the ratification of an international convention renders it a self-executing
treaty, automatically incorporated into national law. Kathryn Christine Arnold, Are the Perpetrators of Honor Killings Getting Away with Murder? Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code Analyzed under the Convention of the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 16 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 1343, 1349 (2001). Jordan does not consider itself bound by Articles
9(2), 16(1)(d), and 16(1)(g). CEDAW Sessions: Declarations, Reservations and
Objections to CEDAW, U.N. DIV. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm
(last
visited
Apr.
26,
2013);
CEDAW
Success
Stories,
UNIFEM,
http://www.unifem.org/cedaw30/success_stories/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).
20. CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 18, art. 2. The Protocol also contains a process that empowers the Committee to initiate inquiries into “grave
or systemic violations by a State of rights set forth in the Convention,” after
receiving reliable information of such violations. Id. art. 8.
21. Jordan has not adopted the Optional Protocol. CEDAW Status, supra
note 19. The Optional Protocol provides a mechanism for the CEDAW Committee to hold State Parties accountable for human rights abuses which
moves beyond the reporting process and general comments. See CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 18. It contains a communications mechanism that
allows individuals or groups of individuals under the jurisdiction of a State
party to bring complaints to the CEDAW Committee alleging a violation of
any of the rights set forth in the Convention. Id. art 2. The Protocol also contains a process through which the Committee is empowered to initiate an
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tect female workers in sexually violent work environments in
the MNC supplier context. 22 The Jordanian government attempted to discharge its duties under the CEDAW by prosecuting Classic’s supervisor for rape,23 a charge that carried a fifteen-year maximum prison sentence. 24 However, the imprisonment of one man fails to protect other women from the abusive factory conditions permitted by the MNCs employing factories like Classic.25
The CEDAW’s distinctive obligations call for systemic rather
than individualistic sanctions. Therefore, to address this systemic problem, international response to the sexual abuse of
female workers should include holding the “big fish”—the
MNCs—accountable for the labor conditions that are conducive
to these violations. Jordan is in a unique position to enforce
human rights among companies it grants the privilege of doing
business within its borders; it should not be considered to have
met its obligations under the CEDAW until it addresses MNCs’
role in human rights violations against female workers. With-

inquiry into “grave or systemic violations by a State of rights set forth in the
Convention,” after receiving reliable information of such violations. Id. art. 8.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See No Proof of Rape, supra note 3.
24. Rape Case Turns Focus, supra note 5.
25. Allegations of rape and sexual assault against female workers by Classic supervisors were brought to Wal-Mart and Target’s attention at least as
early as 2008 when female workers went on strike to resist workplace abuses.
Three Thousand Workers Strike in Jordan Sewing for Wal-Mart and Other
Companies, INST. FOR GLOBAL LABOUR & HUMAN RIGHTS (Dec. 14, 2007),
http://www.globallabourrights.org/alerts?id=0190. However, after alleging
that their investigations showed no proof of these human rights violations,
both corporations continued to not only use Classic’s products without any
additional enforcement mechanisms of Classic’s code of conduct, but also continued to employ the supervisors repeatedly accused of heinous activity as
subcontractors. See Responses by Textile Manufacturers and Clothing Retailers to Concerns about Working Conditions in Factories in Jordan, BUS. &
HUMAN
RIGHTS
RES.
CTR,
http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Documents/Jordanfactories (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) (featuring letters from Wal-Mart and Target Corp. dated Oct. 17, 2006, and Oct.
17, 2006, respectively); see also Ross, supra note 4. Similar reports of sexual
abuse are seen as early as 2006, when the IGLHR reported that four young
women were sexually abused by factory managers at Western Factory, a textile supplier plant for Wal-Mart, Kohl’s and GAP located in Jordan’s Qualified Industrial Zone (“QIZ”). HUMAN TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE,
supra note 9, at 11.
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out government oversight and civil sanctions, corporations are
unlikely to prioritize human rights over profits.
Numerous instances of human rights abuses in Jordan 26
demonstrate the need for additional protections of OCWs and a
means of redress for sexual assault through a monetary punitive system.27 While the imprisonment of a lower-level worker
will have no impact on how MNCs organize their labor and enforce workplace health and safety provisions, if Jordan were to
impose civil liability on corporations through pecuniary sanctions and compensation to the victim, MNCs would be more
likely to self-monitor for violations and enforce a stricter code
of conduct to deter violations. 28 Indeed, “[a]s a rational costbenefit calculator, the company is [much more] likely to be responsive to a financial penalty.”29 The failure of the Jordanian
government to effectively enforce women’s rights against these
larger corporate entities to date has left female garment workers in factory settings vulnerable to repeated human rights
abuses.30
This Note will focus on one particular case illustrating the
plight of female overseas contract factory workers in Jordan to
reveal the ineffectiveness of the CEDAW enforcement in MNC
factory environments, and to identify the problems inherent to
Jordan’s relationship with MNCs and its lack of oversight
thereof. This Note will then argue that to realize the goals of
the CEDAW, Jordan should focus on deterrence of sex crimes
against women in the workplace through a top-down enforcement mechanism, by placing liability for workplace abuses not
only on individual offenders, but also on the MNCs benefiting
from such practices.
Part I describes Jordan’s OCW labor system with regards to
women in the textile industry. Part II identifies the Articles of
the CEDAW relevant to female factory workers and the rights
Jordan must protect under the CEDAW. Part III discusses why
Jordan’s current treatment of workplace abuses in the MNC
26. See SEXUAL PREDATORS, supra note 3, at 4; see also HUMAN TRAFFICKING
& INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, supra note 9.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See James Gobert, Controlling Corporate Criminality: Penal Sanctions
JCLI
(1998),
and
Beyond,
2
WEB
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1998/issue2/gobert2.html.
29. Id.
30. See infra Part III.
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supplier factory setting does not offer proper relief for victims
or the female workforce in general and thus does not discharge
Jordan’s duties under the CEDAW. Part IV suggests overall
changes Jordan should make to better protect female workers—in the form of sexual harassment laws—and proposes to
hold MNCs accountable for violations of such laws in order to
end workplace abuse from the top down.
I. THE OCW SYSTEM AND FEMALE MNC TEXTILE INDUSTRY
WORKERS
Jordan’s worker demographics consists of approximately
17.38% migrant OCWs (also known as guest workers), nonJordanian nationals engaging in labor activities. 31 Migrants
move from one state to another, in large part due to the structural economic inequalities among states with respect to access, opportunity, and compensation.32 While Jordan provided
much of the migrant labor to the region’s other Arab countries
during the oil price increases of 1973 and 1974, recent economic agreements have reversed this trend and attracted OCWs to
work within Jordan’s borders.33
The influx of OCWs into Jordan has been heightened by the
manual labor and production needs of Western-based companies that established manufacturing plants in the country. In
1997, the Qualified Industrial Zone Agreement (“Agreement”)
was signed between Jordan and the United States, creating
privileges for those factories that comply with the Agreement’s

31. See
Jordan
Background
Note,
U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
STATE,
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/jordan/180176.htm (last updated Mar. 25,
2011). Of Jordan’s estimated 1.8 million person workforce, 313,000 are registered guest workers. Id. International Convention of the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res.
45/158, art. (2)(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990) (definition of migrant laborer).
32. See Joan Fitzpatrick & Katrina R. Kelly, Gendered Aspects of Migration: Law and the Female Migrant, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 64–
65 (1998) (describing the disparities and noting that Singapore, Malaysia,
Hong Kong, and oil-rich Gulf states constitute states receiving women for
migrant labor).
33. DAVID ZISKIND, LABOR LAWS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: TRADITION IN TRANSIT
56 (1990); see also Labor Force, in JORDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY (Helen Chapin
Metz ed. 1989), available at http://countrystudies.us/jordan/48.htm.
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requirements.34 Since 1998, Jordan has enjoyed duty- and quota-free access to the U.S. market, pursuant to the Agreement,
for products made in the Qualified Industrial Zone (“QIZ”),
production areas designated by Jordanian authorities and approved by the United States government. 35 QIZ factories in
Jordan are also exempt from almost all local Jordanian taxes
including: “all income tax on corporate profits; all income and
social services taxes on the salaries and allowances paid to nonJordanian workers; all import and export duties on raw materials, parts, and finished goods for export; and all licensing fees
as well as local building and land taxes.”36 QIZ factories, owned
mainly by foreigners,37 can also repatriate 100% of their profits
to their country of origin.38 Since signing the QIZ Agreement,
Jordan has since become a magnet for apparel manufacturing.
In 2001, Jordan made steps to further attract industries to
use its labor when it entered into a free trade agreement with
the United States (“USFTA”), allowing American companies to
import goods from Jordan tariff-free. 39 In addition, the USFTA
34. The Agreement Establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) Between Jordan
and the United States of America, MINISTRY OF INDUS. & TRADE, THE
HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, [hereinafter Jordanian Ministry on
USFTA], available at http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=703 (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).
35. Id.
[T]he objective of these zones is to promote peace and stability
through economic integration in the region, Jordanian, Egyptian and
Israeli goods originating in the QIZ’s were granted un-reciprocal duty free access to US markets. Such an arrangement was beneficial to
both Jordan and Israel: Israel was able to utilize Jordan’s low wage
advantages, and Jordan was able to utilize Israel’s existing market
channel link in the USA, as well as its sophisticated technology and
management. As a result, QIZs have been able to operate at a higher
level of productivity than the rest of the industries in the region. QIZ
exports have now risen to top all other Jordanian exports, making
the USA Jordan’s main export destination.
SAIF, supra note 11, at 5.
36. See HUMAN TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, supra note 9, at
19.
37. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
38. See Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area [USFTA],
U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63.
39. See id. The USFTA is supposedly the “gold standard” for incorporating
international labor rights as set out by the International Labor Organization
(“ILO”), into domestic law. However, the agreement has proved difficult to
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allowed for the elimination of customs duties for garments produced in QIZs. 40 In 1998, before the USFTA and QIZ were
signed, Jordan’s exports to the United States barely reached
US$17 million, but by 2006 those exports surpassed the US$1
billion mark.41 Garments currently account for almost 90% of
Jordanian exports to the United States.42
There are currently nine QIZs in Jordan and 114 investment
companies located in these zones. 43 Out of these investment
companies, fifty-nine export their products to the United
States 44 and hold Qualified Product Request (“QPR”) certificates issued by the Ministry of Industry and Trade.45 Fifty-five
enforce with regards to labor violations. Marley S. Weiss, Two Steps Forward,
One Step Back—or Vice Versa: Labor Rights Under Free Trade Agreements
from NAFTA, Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America, and Beyond, 37
U.S.F. L. REV. 689, 700 (2003). (“[The USFTA] epitomize[s] the superficial
solution of adding externally-set international labor standards to the supranational enforceability of domestic ones, and incorporating labor provisions in
the main body of the agreement . . . .while nominally available, sanctions will
virtually never be applied.”). See USFTA, art. 6(1), 6(3), 41 I.L.M. at 70
(“Each Party shall strive to ensure that its laws provide for labor standards
consistent with the [specified] internationally recognized labor rights and
shall strive to improve those standards in that light.”). Enforcing labor
standards, and particularly the question of who should be enforcing them and
who should be liable for violations, has been the subject of enormous litigation. The Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) is a powerful instrument of remedy
against U.S.-based MNC violations of international human rights. See generally Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor Standards: The
Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 203, 205
(2004). This federal statute may be used as a way of giving force to international agreements pertaining to labor standards by holding companies responsible for their treatment of foreign workers. See id. at 205; see also Maryanov, supra note 13, at 417–22. However, the ATCA is not a substitute for
domestic law, and Jordan must institute its own policies to protect women’s
rights in the workplace as is required under the CEDAW.
40. Jordanian Ministry on USFTA, supra note 34.
41. MINISTRY OF LABOUR, REPORT ON STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE
QUALIFIED INDUSTRIAL ZONES 5 (2006) (Jordan), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/tvpra/20091027c.pdf
[hereinafter
MINISTRY OF LABOUR REPORT].
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. AMIR PROGRAM, JORDAN’S MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT: QIZ UNIT 2–4 (2004), available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACY034.pdf (describing the Qualifying Product Request (“QPR”) certification process). Companies receive a QPR certifi-

2013]

MIGRANT WOMEN IN JORDAN'S QIZs

1307

of these companies operate as subcontractors for U.S.-based
labels, with migrant workers accounting for 76% of the labor
force in these subcontracting companies.46 In 2006, documented
migrant workers totaled 36,149 out of the 54,077 workers in
the 114 QIZ textile company factories.47 The majority of these
guest workers were women.48
Most clothing is made by guest workers from Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka and China, who typically work under low-wage contracts.49 After conducting a survey of Jordanian women working in the QIZ in 2000, the Jordanian Ministry of Labor stated
that, “the working conditions in the Qualifying Industrial
Zones (QIZ) are of sub-standard levels as far as Jordanians are
concerned.” 50 In 2011, the IGLHR reported continued abuses
committed by QIZ factory managers against Asian guest workers, including late payment of wages, withholding of passports,
unsanitary lodging conditions, and police breaking up impromptu strikes.51
cate after meeting content and place of origin requirements. Their products
must “add[] value of not less than 35 percent of the total appraised value of
the product [in Jordan].” Id. In addition, the “QIZ products should be consigned directly from Jordan or Israel to the USA,” and must meet minimum
input requirements from Jordan, Israel, and the USA and/or Palestine. Id;
see also SAIF, supra note 11, at 12–13.
46. MINISTRY OF LABOUR REPORT, supra note 41, at 5–6.
47. Id. at 6.
48. Id.
49. Bustillo, supra note 1; Halaby, supra note 3. As of March 2012, there
were approximately 335,000 migrant workers in Jordan. See INT’L LABOR
OFFICE, DECENT WORK COUNTRY PROGRAMME 2012–2015: JORDAN, at 11
(March 2012) [hereinafter DECENT WORK PROGRAMME], available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/program/dwcp/download/jordan.pdf.
As many as 54,077 of those workers in 2006 were employed in the QIZ. INT’L
LABOR OFFICE, DECENT WORK COUNTRY PROGRAMME, at 11 (Jordan 2006)
[hereinafter Decent Work Programme 2006]. While Jordan’s labor law does
not discriminate between Jordanian and migrant workers, there are increasing reports of violations and abuse of migrant workers’ rights. Id. With regard to women, abuses included the withholding of salary, long working
hours without rest periods, the withholding of passports, and physical and
sexual abuse. See Asia Pacific and Arab States Regional Programme on Empowering Women Migrant Workers in Asia: Jordan, U.N. WOMEN,
http://www.migration-unifem-apas.org/jordan/index.html (last visited Apr.
26, 2013).
50. MINISTRY OF LABOUR REPORT, supra note 41, at 4.
51. See note 3 supra. “Unionized Jordanians may only strike with government permission; non-Jordanians, although allowed to join unions since 2008,
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In 2006, the International Labor Organization (“ILO”), a specialized U.N. agency devoted to “promoting just working conditions,” reported that the Jordanian government had taken
some measures to improve the protection of migrant workers’
rights.52 The ILO saw much room for improvement in Jordan’s
existing infrastructure for protecting guest workers, and developed an “Action Plan” for the management of labor migration
and the protection of migrant workers within Jordan’s borders.53 This Action Plan was based on the International Labor
Organization’s non-binding multi-lateral framework on labor
migration.54 However, the Action Plan has yet to receive official
endorsement or enforcement by the Jordanian government. 55
are not allowed to strike.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2010—
JORDAN, http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2010/jordan [hereinafter WORLD
REPORT 2010].
52. See id. The ILO was created in 1919 and is a tripartite organization
comprised of three constituencies: governments, employers, and employees.
See Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labor Organization (Declaration of Philadelphia), Annex, Oct. 9, 1946, 15
U.N.T.S. 35, available at http://www.un-documents.net/dec-phil.htm. The
goal of the organization is to “promote social justice by promoting just working conditions.” Id. Jordan has ratified a total of twenty-three ILO conventions. DECENT WORK PROGRAMME, supra note 49, at 19. This includes seven of
the eight fundamental conventions (with the exception of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87)), and
three of the four “priority” governance conventions (with the exception of the
Labor Inspection (Agriculture) Convention (No. 129)). Conventions and RecLABOUR
ORG.,
ommendations,
INT’L
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labourstandards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang—en/index.htm (follow hyperlink for particular convention, scroll to bottom and select “ratifications by
country”) (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). The fundamental conventions include:
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention
(No. 87), Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98),
Forced Labour Convention (No. 29), Abolition of Forced Labour Convention
(No. 105), Minimum Age Convention (No. 138), Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention (No. 182), Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111). Id. The governance Conventions include: Labour Inspection Convention (No. 81), Employment Policy Convention (No. 122), Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention (No. 129), Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards)
Convention (No. 144). Id.
53. MINISTRY OF LABOUR REPORT, supra note 41, at 3.
54. Id. See note 52 supra.
55. Migrants,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH,
http://www.hrw.org/en/topic/migrants (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).
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Thus, Jordan currently lacks a method of monitoring factories
in the QIZs,56 and relies on corporate entities to manage their
own facilities. However, the numerous human rights violations
by MNC conscripted factories reported by the IGLHR, such as
those at Classic, illustrate a lack of enforcement of corporate
codes of conduct and a lack of monitoring for the safety and
health of female workers under male supervision in the work
place.57
II. THE CEDAW’S APPLICABILITY
As one of the most widely ratified international human rights
treaties,58 the CEDAW has the potential to be a powerful tool
for empowering female factory workers. The CEDAW makes
State Parties responsible for the discriminatory conduct of nonstate actors, and obligates states to take affirmative steps to
eliminate those practices. 59 The CEDAW addresses systemic
causes of discrimination and seeks to correct both discriminatory treatment, as well as the discriminatory effects of local
stereotypes. 60 Combined with this guarantee of substantive
56. Jordanian Ministry on USFTA, supra note 34. Of the currently thirteen QIZs in Jordan, only three are governmental while the rest are owned by
the private sector. Id. Though the Ministry of Labor has a labor inspection
and complaints mechanism, it has many institutional limitations, such as a
limited number of labor inspectors, hampering its ability to check the 114
separate companies and facilities in the QIZ on a consistent basis for human
rights abuses. MINISTRY OF LABOUR REPORT, supra note 41, at 5, 8.
57. See sources cited supra note 3.
58. There are only seven states in the world that have not ratified the
CEDAW: Iran, Palau, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tonga, and the United
States. CEDAW Status, supra note 19.
59. See CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 2(e).
60. See id. art 1. “[T]he concept of substantive equality has been defined as
‘directed at eliminating individual, institutional and systemic discrimination
against disadvantaged groups which effectively undermines their full and
equal social, economic, political, and cultural participation in society.’” Jennifer S. Hainsfurther, A Rights-Based Approach: Using CEDAW to Protect the
Human Rights of Migrant Workers, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 843, 862 (2009)
(quoting RATNA KAPUR & BRENDA COSSMAN, SUBVERSIVE SITES: FEMINIST
ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW IN INDIA 176 (1996)). Substantive equality does not
necessarily mean treating men and women identically; rather, it focuses on
equal opportunity, access, and outcome. See id. at 868; see also Claire
L’Heureux-Dubé, It Takes a Vision: The Constitutionalization of Equality in
Canada, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 363, 368 (2002) (describing substantive
equality as affording “equality of opportunity and of result, not just similar
treatment for those similarly situated”).
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equality, the state obligations detailed in Article 2, prohibiting
discrimination against women, enable OCWs to claim that a
state has violated its legal obligations under the CEDAW by
failing to monitor private employers.61 Given that so many violations of female OCWs’ rights take place at the hands of private actors,62 State Parties’ obligations under Article 2(e), discussed below, play an essential role in creating the States’ legal
obligations towards women migrant workers under the
CEDAW.
A. Overview of the CEDAW
The CEDAW contains a broad definition of discrimination
against women, and describes a number of measures that State
Parties must take to eliminate discrimination in areas such as
participation in public life and the political process, education,
employment, healthcare, economic and social life, and family
relations.63 Article 2 of the Convention condemns discrimination against women “in all [its] forms,”64 and Article 3 further
requires State Parties to take appropriate measures “in all
fields” 65 to guarantee women’s enjoyment of human rights.
Since the CEDAW does not distinguish between the rights of
female citizens and non-citizens,66 it is truly a universal human
rights treaty fully applicable to the plight of OCWs.

61. See CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 2(e).
62. See Rebecca Cook, Accountability in International Law for Violations of
Women’s Rights by Non-State Actors, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (Dorina Dallmeyer ed., 1993) (“[W]omen’s exposure to
discrimination and other denials of human rights will originate through acts
of private persons and institutions, and will continue at this level as women
mature to recognize parallel denials of rights directly attributable to state
action that they encounter in the political, economic and other spheres of national life.”).
63. See CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 1. (“For the purposes of the present
Convention, the term ‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of equality of men
and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.”). See also id. arts. 7–16.
64. Id. art. 2.
65. Id. art. 3.
66. See generally CEDAW, supra note 17. The CEDAW refers to the rights
of women generally, without any qualification based on citizenship.
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To interpret the broad spectrum of rights guaranteed under
the Convention and to create rules of procedure giving effect to
the Convention’s provisions, Part V of the CEDAW establishes
the CEDAW Committee—a board of twenty-three experts selected by State Parties.67 The Committee is empowered to make
general recommendations and suggestions after examining the
annual progress reports by State Parties on the administration
of the CEDAW.68 Although these general recommendations are
not binding, State Parties are generally expected to follow them
in order to fulfill their obligations under the treaty. 69 The
Committee also issues “Concluding Comments” to State Parties
after they submit their progress reports, with specific recommendations for each country to undertake before the next reporting deadline.70
B. The Unique Obligations Imposed by the CEDAW
Nearly all major human rights instruments—for example,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights—prohibit sex-based discrimination. 71 However, the
CEDAW is unique in that it deals with discrimination against

67. Id. arts. 17–19.
68. Id. arts. 21, 18. Each State Party is required to submit a progress report to the Secretary-General within a year after the CEDAW’s entry into
force and then at least every four years thereafter, or whenever the CEDAW
Committee so requests. Id. art. 21. This reporting mechanism is rather weak,
since responsibility falls primarily on the State Party to submit honest and
thorough information regarding its own weaknesses and successes in protecting women’s rights. However, the CEDAW does allow for NGOs to present
“shadow reports” to the Committee as a commentary on the State Party official report. Id. art. 18; see also A Note About Shadow Reports, STOP VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN, http://www.stopvaw.org/a_note_about_shadow_reports (last
updated Nov. 1, 2003). Shadow reports by NGOs can provide reliable and
independent information to the CEDAW Committee on the actual progress of
the State Party in implementing and enforcing reform. Id.
69. See Hainsfurther, supra note 60, at 860.
70. See id. at 857.
71. INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNAL LEGAL OBLIGATION OF
COMPANIES 24 (2002) [hereinafter BEYOND VOLUNTARISM], available at
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/7/107_report_en.pdf.
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women from a systemic standpoint.72 Article 2(e) of the Convention dictates that State Parties must “take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any
person, organization, or enterprise.” 73 This includes violence
committed by private citizens.74 The CEDAW Committee established that a State Party is liable for failing to protect a woman
from abuse by her husband, and proposed that a state must act
“with due diligence to prevent and respond to such violence
against women.”75 In addition, a State Party is also liable for
the actions of corporations within its borders under the “due
diligence” standard.76 The standard, which has been accepted
by many international tribunals, dictates that:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State (for example, because
it is the act of a private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation [of
human rights] or to respond to it as required by the Convention.77

A state has an obligation to “prevent, investigate, and punish”78
any violation of the rights in the Convention that occurs within
72. See Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights under the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1996).
73. See CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 2(e).
74. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Consideration of Communication No. 2/2003 (A.T. v. Hungary) pursuant to article
7, paragraph 3 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 9.2, UN Doc.
CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 (Jan. 26, 2005) (noting that the CEDAW Committee
held the state had failed to uphold its CEDAW obligations in failing to protect woman from being battered by her husband).
75. Id. ¶ 9.6(II)(f) (explaining that under the CEDAW, a state must
“[i]nvestigate promptly, thoroughly, impartially and seriously all allegations
of domestic violence and bring the offenders to justice in accordance with international standards.”).
76. See Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, 1988 InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 172 (July 29, 1988).
77. Id. This court was addressing state liability for non-state actions with
regard to violations of the American Convention on Human Rights. The
CEDAW Committee has since adopted the “due diligence standard” with regard to the CEDAW. See infra note 79.
78. Id.
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its jurisdiction.79 Thus, a state that fails to monitor and investigate MNC supplier factories, and fails to hold offenders accountable for abuses against women in the workplace, would
fail under the due diligence standard of the CEDAW.
The CEDAW also protects the interests of women with provisions on gender-equality in the workplace. States Parties must
take all appropriate measures to ensure the right of men and
women to equal employment opportunities,80 and equal remuneration and treatment.81 State Parties must also work to prohibit dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or maternity
leave,82 and allow for maternity leave “with pay or some comparable social benefits without the loss of [] employment, seniority or social allowances.” 83 While the CEDAW appears to
provide broad protections to women in the workplace, a major
gap exists in that migrant women employed in QIZ factories
are not protected by Jordan’s normal labor laws that institute
these protections. 84 This limitation on the scope of enforcement
of the CEDAW was made as a concession by Jordanian authorities to encourage economic growth in the QIZ.
Although violence against women is not explicitly mentioned
in the CEDAW text, in its 1992 General Recommendation, the
Committee determined that gender-based violence is in fact
“discrimination” within the meaning of the term, as broadly

79. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, ¶ 9,
U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992) [hereinafter CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19] (adopting the
Velasquez-Rodriguez due diligence standard).
80. CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 11(1)(b).
81. Id. art. 11(1)(d).
82. Id. art. 11(2)(a).
83. Id. art. 11(2)(b).
84. See Statement on Labor Strikes in the Qualifying Industrial Zone
JORDANIAN
LABOR
WATCH
2
(2011),
(QIZ),
http://www.phenixcenter.net/en/files/docs/Statement_on_Strikes_in_QIZ_25_
April_2011_copy.pdf (discussing the Jordanian Government’s decision to exclude workers in the QIZ from eligibility for minimum wage). Such exclusions
have worsened the situation of laborers in the QIZ by favoring MNCs and
inviting their business, at the expense of worker health, safety, and justice.
Id. at 2–3. See also Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 8: Equality of
Rights Between Men and Women, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10
(Mar. 29, 2000).
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defined in Article 1.85 The Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly the following year, also recognized the relationship between violence and equality.
Recognizing that violence against women is a manifestation of
historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination
against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and the violence against women is one
of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced
into a subordinate position compared with men . . .86

Jordan has taken steps toward addressing violence and sexual
abuse against domestic guest workers. 87 However, similar
measures have not been taken to address these issues in the
public sector of the factory workplace. Sexual harassment,
abuse, and rape in the context of worker-supervisor relationships is clearly within the purview of the Convention and thus
Jordan is obliged to take measures to combat these types of violence.88 Yet, in spite of Jordan’s professed commitment to ensuring equal rights and protecting women migrant workers,89
and in spite of its obligation to address violence against women
“in all fields,” there is no law within the Jordanian civil or penal code defining and forbidding sexual harassment in the
workplace or in other public areas.90
85. CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 79, ¶ 6 (interpreting articles of the
CEDAW that are relevant to violence against women and making recommendations to states to address this issue).
86. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res.
48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993).
87. See DECENT WORK PROGRAMME, supra note 49, at 18.
88. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
89. See MINISTRY OF LABOUR REPORT, supra note 41, at 9 (discussing Jordan’s commitment to migrant worker’s rights through its UNIFEM project).
90. See Preserving Rights, JORDAN TIMES (Aug. 29, 2011),
http://jordantimes.com/preserving-rights; see also AMIRA EL-AZHARY SONBOL,
WOMEN OF JORDAN: ISLAM, LABOR & THE LAW, 114 (2003). The Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (“CEACR”),
the legal body responsible for examining compliance by ILO member-states
with the Convention recommended in 2010 that Jordan include “a clear definition of what constitutes sexual harassment in the workplace” and “take
appropriate measures to raise awareness of and prevent and protect against
sexual harassment in the workplace.” Although Jordan has apparently made
amendments to the Labour Code (Act No. 48 of 2008), in particular section 29
that provides for sanctions in the case of sexual assault by an employer), the
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C. Intersectionality Between Marginalized Status and Sexual
Violence
The experience of female guest workers in Jordan must be
understood not only through the eyes of a woman, but also from
the perspective of an immigrant and ethnic minority. “[L]egal
policies at the national and international levels continue to be
framed with inadequate knowledge of, and responsiveness to,
the distinct experiences of female migrants.” 91 Gender-based
discrimination intersects with discrimination based on other
forms of otherness, such as immigrant or foreigner status, race,
ethnicity, religion, and economic status. These multiple forms
of discrimination place migrant women in the QIZ in situations
of double, triple, or even quadruple the disadvantage, marginalization, and vulnerability.
Human Rights Watch reports that in general, “many migrants silently accept the exploitation and deprivation of their
rights because they view themselves as powerless and without
effective remedy.”92 This vulnerability is due in part to the concentration of women migrant workers in certain occupations
such as textile manufacturing—a sector that is not covered by
Jordan’s normal labor codes.93 The kafala sponsorship system94
in the Middle East contributes to this vulnerability in that it
makes each worker’s sponsor or employer almost completely

CEACR noted, “it remains doubtful whether the legislation is effectively addressing all forms of sexual harassment.” Direct Request of the Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111)—Jordan,
81st Sess. (2010).
91. Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 32, at 48.
92. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BAD DREAMS: EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE OF
MIGRANT WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA 5 (2004) [hereinafter BAD DREAMS].
93. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
94. See Middle East: End ‘Sponsored’ Gateway to Human Trafficking,
RIGHTS
WATCH
(June
14,
2010),
HUMAN
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/14/middle-east-end-sponsored-gatewayhuman-trafficking [hereinafter End ‘Sponsored’ Gateway to Human Trafficking]; see also Azfar Khan & Hélène Harroff-Tavel, Presentation: The Implications of the Sponsorship System: Challenges and Opportunities,
http://www.unescap.org/sdd/meetings/beirut-June2011/Harroff-ILOImplications-of-the-sponsorship-system.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) (“[The]
kafala system is denounced globally as [a] system of structural dependence
between an employer and migrant worker[.] . . . [It] provides the legal basis
for the residency and employment of migrant workers[.]”).
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responsible for the worker.95 A strong criticism of the kafala
system is that, “[i]n combination with gaps in labor protections
. . . the kafala system gives employers tremendous control over
workers”96 since employees feel indebted to their sponsors for
the mere opportunity to work. Jordan also mandates that employers in the QIZ be responsible for repatriating the migrant
factory workers upon termination of their employment. Migrant workers who cannot afford the plane fare back to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or China therefore have no choice but to
continue to work for their employer. These workers cannot
leave until their employer unilaterally decides that they are no
longer needed, or allows them to work for another employer.97
Otherwise, women may quit their jobs and be deported, likely
without compensation for whatever abuses and wage theft
were perpetrated against them at the factory. 98 Therefore,
women that want to work in Jordan may have to endure whatever conditions their employers place them in.99
Notwithstanding the known risks to their safety and freedom, female workers have increasingly turned to jobs in lowwage factory settings.100 “Third World women have become the
new ‘factory girls,’ providing cheap labor for globetrotting corporations.” 101 While a female assembly line worker in the
95. See Ministry of Labour, Instructions for the Conditions and Procedures
of Bringing and Employing Non-Jordanian Workers in the Qualified Industrial Zones issued pursuant to Labour Law Art. 12, Regulation No. 36 (1997)
(Jordan)
[hereinafter
QIZ
Regulation
of
Fees],
available
at
http://www.mol.gov.jo/Portals/1/qize.pdf. Both IGLHR’s 2008 and 2011 publications on factory abuse in Jordan reported employers withholding workers’
passports, forcing workers to work long hours without rest, working overtime
without pay, inadequate food and housing conditions, among other abuses.
The women subjected to such conditions reported feeling trapped without any
form of redress, fearing termination and deportation if they complained. See
generally SEXUAL PREDATORS, supra note 3.
96. See End ‘Sponsored’ Gateway to Human Trafficking, supra note 94.
97. See id. Human Rights Watch reports that most governments in the
Middle East require workers to obtain their sponsor’s written consent before
allowing them to take up new employment. See id.
98. See id.
99. See LIM, supra note 10, at 16.
100. Id. at 34–35 (discussing how the feminization of poverty affects the
incentives to migrate and the role a woman’s lack of education may play in
the decision to enter a demeaning work environment).
101. ANNETTE FUENTES & BARBARA EHRENREICH, WOMEN IN THE GLOBAL
FACTORY 5 (1983).
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United States is likely to earn between US$5 and US$9.19 an
hour,102 in Jordan, the minimum wage is between US$7 and
US$8 a day.103 Some have pointed out:
Low wages are the main reason companies move to the Third
World . . . Corporate executives, with their eyes glued to the
bottom line, wonder why they should pay someone in Massachusetts on an hourly basis what someone in the Philippines
will earn in a day. And, for that matter, why pay a male
worker anywhere to do what a female worker can be hired to
do for 40 to 60 percent less?104

Female workers have historically been subject to inequality
and abuses in the workplace. For that reason, the CEDAW
plays a crucial role in guaranteeing their human rights are respected in such an exploitative environment. Women migrant
workers are exposed to harassment, intimidation or threats to
themselves and their families, economic and sexual exploitation, racial discrimination and xenophobia, poor working conditions, increased health risks, and other forms of abuse—
including trafficking into forced labor, debt bondage, involuntary servitude and situations of captivity.105
In Jordan, women guest workers are more vulnerable to discrimination, exploitation, and abuse relative not only to male
migrants but also to native-born women.106 Until recently, migrant workers in Jordan were not permitted to join labor un102. See Minimum Wage Laws in the States—January 1, 2013, U.S. DEP’T
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm (last visited Apr.
16, 2013).
103. 2008 Human Rights Report: Jordan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
AND
LABOR
(Feb.
25,
2009)
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119118.htm. As of 2009, the
minimum wage in Jordan is 110 Jordanian dinars (€109) or US$154 per
month. Jordan Ministry of Labor inspectors enforce the minimum wage for
Jordanians but due to limited resources, are unable to ensure full compliance
by all employers. Id.
104. FUENTES & EHRENREICH, supra note 101, at 5–6. See also Laura Fitzpatrick, Why Do Women Still Earn Less Than Men?, TIME (Apr. 20, 2010)
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1983185,00.html#ixzz1clZDv
1YI.
105. See LIM, supra note 10, at 9–28.
106. Id. at 13–14. In Jordan, the Ministry of Labor is actively working to
substitute Jordanians into jobs held by migrant workers in the QIZ. However,
there has not been much voluntary movement into those positions by Jordanian’s given the low wages and demeaning work conditions associated with
the positions. See QIZ Regulation of Fees, supra note 95.
OF
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ions, and currently, Jordan still does not allow migrant workers to strike against employers.107 Thus, women in MNC supplier factories lack negotiation power and are unable to react
against abuse and breaches of their human rights unless some
other agency assists in the complaint process. For this reason,
female guest workers are among the most vulnerable persons
in society to sexual harassment and rape.108 Additionally, because such women have limited standing in society, and limited
access to the legal process, the need to protect them is much
higher.
Fortunately, there is a growing international consensus to
prevent and combat sexual harassment in the workplace,
which is considered a form of violence against women.109 India’s
landmark case, Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan,110 is a beacon of
hope for the human right to be free from sex-based violence by
employers. The Indian Supreme Court held that the guarantee
of equality for women should be interpreted in light of the principle that “[g]ender equality includes protection from sexual
harassment and the right to work with dignity.”111 The Vishaka
court concluded that the complete absence of a sexual harassment law and damages remedy in Rajasthan violated global
norms and constitutional human rights guarantees. 112 The
court reasoned that with sexual harassment laws in place, and
enforced, more women may feel comfortable coming forward to
report systemic abuses by private actors and states may move
toward effective deterrence of such violations.113
The CEDAW Committee has authored several Comments
discussing the specific problems of migrant women. These
Comments called upon states to “monitor closely the terms and
107. See WORLD REPORT 2010, supra note 51.
108. INT’L LABOR ORG., IN SEARCH OF DECENT WORK—MIGRANT WORKERS’
RIGHTS: A MANUAL FOR TRADE UNIONISTS 25 (2008), available at
http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/uploads/gmgtopics/labour/ILO_A_manual_for_trade_unionists_ILO_2008.pdf.
109. See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A.
Res. 48/104, supra note 86; Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,
Rep. in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/85,
¶¶ 42–50, Comm’n on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1997/47 (Feb. 5, 1996) (by
Radhika Coomaraswamy).
110. Vishaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 (India).
111. Id. ¶ 10.
112. See id. ¶¶ 10, 14.
113. See id. ¶ 7.
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conditions of contracts, conditions of work and salaries of women migrants, and devise strategies and policies for their full
integration in the labour force and for elimination of direct and
indirect discrimination.”114 The Comments recommended that
in following these guidelines, states should “focus on the causes
of women’s migration and to develop policies and measures to
protect migrant women against exploitation and abuse.”115 In
addition, states should “take more effective measures to eliminate discrimination against refugee migrant, and minority
women and girls.” 116 However, even these recommended
measures fail to adequately address the problem of intersectionality faced by female migrant factory workers in Jordan, a
concept that is integral to assessing liability for sexually-based
human rights abuses.
Professor Kimberle Crenshaw, who writes extensively on critical race theory, reflected that, “battering and rape, once seen
as private (family matters) and aberrational (errant sexual aggression), are now largely recognized as part of a broad-scale
system of domination that affects women as a class.”117 In the
specific context of rape and sexual harassment in the work
place, where male employers exercise domination over female
workers, there are many sex, gender, race, and ethnic stereotypes at play. Although the CEDAW and CEDAW Committee
partly address these issues using notions of substantive and
procedural equality, they fail to explicitly draw the connection
between isolated crimes of sexual abuse and harassment, and
the context of systemic discrimination and coercion that often
makes such crimes possible. In the corporate factory setting,
114. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments: of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Cyprus, 35th Sess., May 15–June 2, 2006, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/5 (May 30, 2006).
115. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Cambodia, 34th Sess., Jan. 16–Feb. 3, 2006, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/KHM/CO/3 (Jan. 25, 2006).
116. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Australia, 34th Sess., Jan. 16–Feb. 3, 2006, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/AUL/CO/5 (Feb. 3, 2006).
117. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1241
(1991).
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this parallel is especially important because workplace rape
and harassment gain their lifeblood from corporate complicity
in those, among other, human rights violations.
The recognition of crimes once thought to be individualistic,
as social and systemic, is an important shift towards holding
MNCs responsible for the conditions in subcontractor factories
that facilitate the sexual abuse this Note seeks to address. It is
crucial to understand that while women suffer many of the
same types of human rights violations, the experience of every
woman whose rights the CEDAW seeks to protect is different.
Such differences in experience may compound a woman’s vulnerability to, and degree of, abuse suffered. Accordingly, this
increased vulnerability should be taken into account by State
Parties when adopting measures to address these human
rights violations and when assessing the degree of intervention
required of states by the CEDAW. Female guest workers need
special protection from Jordanian authorities to come forward
and vindicate their rights, to avoid being shamed, silenced, deported, and forgotten.
III. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
In the private sector, MNCs have adopted codes of conduct in
response to accusations of irresponsibility in monitoring garment factories.118 Jordan only began inspecting private sector
workplaces in 2004; it has less than eighty inspectors to enforce
all labor laws in more than 55,000 companies and factories.119
Like other developing countries, Jordan relies on corporate enforcement of internal codes of conduct in lieu of government
oversight of supplier factories. 120 These codes of conduct are

118. See generally Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe- Darricarrère, Enforcing International Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 663 (1995) (discussing the development of external
and internal codes of conduct for international business operations).
119. SOLIDARITY CENTER, JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER
RIGHTS
IN
JORDAN
33–34
(2005),
available
at
www.solidaritycenter.org/files/JordanFinal.pdf. “One way to reduce gender
and ethnic inequities in the workplace is through strong enforcement of labor
law, using a system of consistent inspection. But Jordan’s labor inspection
service is ineffective and not always enforced.” Id. at 33.
120. See Richard Locke et al., Beyond Corporate Codes of Conduct: Work
Organization and Labour Standards at Nike’s Suppliers, 146 INT’L LABOUR
REV. 21, 22–23 (2007).
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voluntary121 and have inherent shortcomings due their limited
scope and lack of meaningful enforcement.122 For example, the
language of MNC codes of conduct has historically been more
aspirational than a hard and fast legal policy. 123 However,
MNCs have recently begun to use codes of conduct as contractual instruments, rather than idealistic goals, to set guidelines
for their suppliers.124 Therefore, while MNCs have traditionally
claimed innocence when a subcontractor committed a violation,
given the shift in the understanding of codes of conduct as enforceable contracts, ignorance of a subcontractor’s noncompliance can no longer separate an MNC from the abuses it benefits from.
Human rights abuses in the MNC textile industry occur
mainly within the supply chain.125 Therefore, the issue arises
as to whether MNCs may be held responsible and liable for
human rights violations of their supplier factories. Like many
companies in the manufacturing sector, the MNCs utilizing the
services of factories like Classic rely on a “triangle” manufacturing system.126 The recent economic developments in Jordan
provide a perfect illustration of this system, where MNCs outsource labor-intensive products to subcontracted companies in
newly industrialized, low-wage countries. 127 This business
strategy provides an inherent separation between MNCs (being
the parent companies) and their subcontractors which are considered independent legal entities.128 This position of independence from the subcontractors allows MNCs to place the blame
for human rights violations onto their supplier plants to protect
121. For example, U.S. President Clinton announced a voluntary code of
human rights principles for American companies operating abroad. See David
E. Sanger, Clinton to Urge a Rights Code for Businesses Dealing Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at D1.
122. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrère, supra note 118, at 686–89 (discussing that while it is easy to draft a corporate code of conduct, “effective
implementation is the real test” of the corporation’s commitment to human
rights).
123. Maryanov, supra note 13, at 407–08.
124. Id.
125. See Caroline Kaeb, Emerging Issues of Human Rights Responsibility in
the Extractive and Manufacturing Industries: Patterns and Liability Risks, 6
NW. U.J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 327, ¶ 54 (2008).
126. See id. ¶ 56.
127. See id.
128. See id.
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their own brand reputation—just as Macy’s, Kohl’s, and Lands’
End attempted to do in the Classic case.129 However, for the
CEDAW to have legal teeth in Jordan’s QIZ factory context,
MNCs must be held accountable for the work environments of
their supplier factories since it is the MNCs that are effectively
making the labor policies through their action and inaction.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, in Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 130 set a valuable precedent in the international
community that a company can be liable for knowingly aiding
and abetting a state actor to commit human rights abuses,
such as forced labor, murder, rape, and torture, by providing
“practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”131
129. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
130. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’g in part and
aff’g in part 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000), vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th
Cir. 2005).
131. Id. at 950. This case was brought in a federal district court against
Unocal Corporation for the use of forced labor in Unocal’s gas pipeline project
in Burma. The case is notable because of its two seemingly conflicting opinions. The first judge who presided in the case issued an opinion that established that Unocal, as an MNC, could be sued for violations of international
law under the ATCA—specifically, for continuing to employ the Burmese military, even after knowing of the military’s use of forced labor. Id. The case
was reheard and affirmed in part and vacated in part, and in a subsequent
opinion issued by a different circuit court judge, the case was dismissed and
the district court decision vacated. Doe v. Unocal, 403 F.3d 708. The district
court decision upon remand from the 2002 decision found that Unocal’s actions were not sufficient to create liability, because Unocal had not affirmatively sought out forced labor for the pipeline. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1310. The
two opinions provide conflicting accounts of the kind of MNC conduct that is
sufficient to trigger possible corporate liability. However, in the case of Jordan’s QIZ factories, it seems that MNCs affirmatively seek out companies
with the lowest cost of labor in order to gain the greatest profit, however lower labor costs are correlative with lower labor standards and an increased
number of human rights violations. See Miles Wolpin, Fair Labor Standards,
Economic Well-Being and Human Rights as Costs of “Free-Trade,” INT’L
JOURNAL
PEACE
STUDIES,
n.10,
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol2_1/Wolpin.htm. “[L]ack of safe
working conditions and independent unions in Mexico contribute to phenomenally low labor costs, thus creating an unfair trade advantage.” Id. (quoting
Thomas Karter, Free Trade Agreement is President Bush’s Class Act, IN
THESE TIMES, Nov. 1992, at 11, 16) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Since
Mexico has much lower wages and a poor record of enforcing its often weaker
environmental and consumer laws, U.S. businesses would have a strong incentive to move across the border.” Id. (quoting Public Health Achievements
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Furthermore, even if the corporation has not actively participated in human rights abuses carried out by state actors, “a
company that voluntarily enters a business environment, or
stays there, when they know or should know that they are
somehow benefiting from ongoing human rights violations, has,
at least, a moral duty to take reasonable steps to prevent or
stop the violations.”132
In the case of Jordan, reports of sexual abuse in MNC factories have been present since 2006.133 Furthermore, allegations
of rape and sexual assault of female workers by Classic supervisors were specifically brought to Wal-Mart and Target’s attention at least as early as 2008, when female workers at the
Ad Dulayl Industrial Zone went on strike to resist workplace
abuse.134 However, neither corporation took an active position
on the matter, and Wal-Mart in particular maintained that the
allegations lacked evidentiary support.135 Wal-Mart and Target
continued to use Classic’s products, without any changes to
their codes of conduct or enforcement mechanisms, and even
continued to employ the supervisors that were repeatedly accused of engaging in these heinous activities.136 Critics of MNC
self-regulation have pointed out that MNCs find greater compliance in supplier plants when they schedule factory inspections in advance. This allows the plants to prepare viewing areas, and select and coach the workers that will be interviewed,
as was the case in the 2011 Classic rape investigation.137 Indeed, inadequate monitoring of factories by the state and contracting MNCs creates an “environment of impunity” 138 for
subcontractor and supervisor abuse of workers.
Endangered by North American Free Trade Agreement, PUB. CITIZEN HEALTH
RES. GROUP HEALTH LETTER, Mar. 1993, at 8–9) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
132. BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 71, at 132.
133. See, e.g., HUMAN TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, supra note 9,
at 16, 20.
134. See Human Trafficking and Abusive Conditions at the Mediterranean
Garments Factory in the Ad Dulayl Industrial Zone in Jordan, NAT’L LABOR
COMM., http://www.globallabourrights.org/reports?id=0530 (last updated
Sept. 6, 2008).
135. See Bustillo, supra note 1.
136. See supra notes 25–26.
137. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
138. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SWEPT UNDER THE RUG: ABUSES AGAINST
DOMESTIC WORKERS AROUND THE WORLD 34 (2006).
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The corporate entities that knowingly continued to engage in
business with Classic, despite the reported abuses, may be seen
as aiding and abetting the sexual assault and harassment carried out by supervisors at the factory.139 Though the concept of
corporate liability for aiding and abetting human rights abuses
stemmed from U.S. cases, such as Unocal, the International
Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunals for
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have explicitly incorporated this standard into their statutes for liability of non-state
actors.140 Thus, the crime of aiding and abetting has been applied in an international context,141 and it would not be a far
reach for Jordan to institute a similar statute in its civil laws
with respect to the sexual abuse and harassment of women in
the workplace.
While a corporation technically cannot rape an employee, its
role is analogous to knowingly supplying a perpetrator with the
place, authority, opportunity, and funds to carry out rape,
physical assault, forced labor, and other human rights abuses.142 Acknowledging corporations as tortfeasors is essential to
139. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
140. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25, ¶ 3(c), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 6, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994);
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 827,
art. 7, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
141. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 71, at 55–58.
142. See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the
Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 336–37 (1985).
[T]he doctrine of complicity (sometimes referred to as the law of aiding and abetting, or accessorial liability) emerges to define the circumstances in which one person (to whom I will refer to as the secondary party or actor, accomplice, or accessory) becomes liable for
the crime of another. . . . The nature of complicity liability follows
from the considerations that called it forth. The secondary party’s liability is derivative, which is to say, it is incurred by virtue of a violation of law by the primary party to which the secondary party contributed. It is not direct [liability]. . . . One who “aids and abets” [the
primary party] to do these acts, in the traditional language of the
common law, can be liable for doing so, but not because she has
thereby caused the actions of the principal or because the actions of
the principal are her acts. Her liability must rest on the violation of
law by the principal, the legal consequences of which she incurs because of her own actions. It is important not to misconstrue derivative liability as imparting vicarious liability. Accomplice liability
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holding them accountable for their actions, or inactions, in order to promote the welfare of migrant women in Jordan and
improve their work environment. The sexual and non-sexual
abuses carried out at Classic were one of many factors that
served to frighten the female workers at the factory, and coerce
them into doing exactly as their supervisors demanded. Many
of these demands, such as working overtime, and working
without pay or rest, directly benefited the MNC contracting
parties’ interests by keeping costs low and ensuring an efficient, obedient work force.143
While criminal prosecutions are currently used to hold the
factory supervisors charged with these abuses liable, they are
an inadequate legal remedy. Since individual criminal prosecutions “focus attention on personal guilt and away from structural or systemic causes,”144 these trials do not address the full
problem of discrimination. For example, as seen in the United
States and abroad, even the death penalty does not deter violent behavior when the root causes of such behavior are systemic and societal in nature.145 Though criminal prosecutions
are necessary to deter individuals from committing crimes
against vulnerable populations, the CEDAW aims to address
the root causes of violence against women. In the case of Jordan’s QIZ factories, corporate complicity in abusive workplace
environments is a main reason such violence against migrant
women in the QIZ persists.146 Such abuse will sadly continue so

does not involve imposing liability on one party for the wrongs of another solely because of the relationship between the parties. Liability
requires action by the secondary actor . . . that makes it appropriate
to blame him for what the primary actor does. The term “derivative”
as used here merely means that her liability is dependent on the
principal violating the law.
Id.
143. See infra notes 146, 174–76 and accompanying text.
144. HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1368 (2007).
145. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at ¶ 120 (S. Afr.) (“Homelessness, unemployment, poverty and the frustration consequent upon such
conditions are other causes of the crime wave.”).
146. The USFTA supports the claim that “economic well-being will be maximized by each country’s specialization in producing at the lowest possible
cost those exports in which it has a “comparative advantage.” See Wolpin,
supra note 131. Jordan’s comparative advantage happens to be cheap labor.
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long as MNCs continue to prioritize profits and consumer satisfaction over the human rights of the workers in the supplier
plants.
There is no consensus in the international community as to
whether a corporation may be held liable for international human rights abuses.147 While it is clear that non-state actors operating under the color of the law may be penalized for committing abuses, including aiding and abetting such abuses, corpoThis directly impacts labor because standards are deregulated in order to
increase capital and maintain this advantage.
The transnational corporations generally have had an edge over national unions. Labor is less mobile than capital (since labor is tied to
a particular community or region), and can protest only within the
boundaries of the nation-state. But capital is highly mobile because
it can move from one nation to another in search of labor, raw materials, credit, and markets. Each move across national boundaries,
therefore, strengthens transnational capital at the expense of the
national labor unions, local communities, and the nation-state, leading to loss of jobs, decrease in tax revenues, and dislocation of the
national economy . . . . At its essence, then, “free trade” is more
about unrestricted profit maximization and capital mobility . . . than
eliminating residual barriers to trade in goods and services [in order
to enrich the economies of all nations involved in the treaty].
Id.
147. While there are cases in which corporate entities have been found
guilty of crimes, there have been no civil cases against corporate entities for
violations of human rights which do not fall under crimes of universal jurisdiction. For example, in the war crimes trials at Nuremberg, corporations
were implicated for the crimes of their directors in United States v. Krupp, see
Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon—An
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 112 (2002), and were implicated as criminal instrumentalities in United States v. Krauch, see id. at
106. Corporations may be held criminally liable under theories of agency,
aiding and abetting, and accomplice liability. See generally Eric Engle, Extraterritorial Corporate Criminal Liability: A Remedy for Human Rights Violations?, 20 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 287 (2006). However, in order to be held civilly liable before a U.S. court, corporations need to be acting under the color of
the law, or be a “willful participant in joint action with the State or its
agents.” See Ramasastry, supra, at 137. There is no cause of action for a corporation that is merely complicit in human rights abuses, independent of
state action, for its own benefit. Under Article 2(e) of the CEDAW, the state
may be held liable for failing to stop abuses against women by private actors.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text. However, this does not provide
victims of sexual abuse an actionable claim against the corporate entities
themselves.
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rations occupy an amorphous position. Indeed, over two centuries ago Edward, the First Baron of Thurlow, remarked that,
“[c]orporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to
be condemned. They therefore do as they like.”148 Recent U.S.
litigation, questioning the principles of Doe v. Unocal, shows
that the Baron’s observation still rings true and further obscures whether individuals have a cause of action against corporations.149 However, U.S. MNCs are still subject to the law of
their host nation.150 The treatment of MNC liability under international and U.S. law sheds light on what Jordan can—and
must—do in order to discharge its duties to respect, protect,
and fulfill the rights of women in the factory workplace. The
solution advanced must thus be broad enough to encompass the
actions of contractors at all levels in the MNC supply chain,
with a focus on changing both national and corporate fair labor
enforcement mechanisms.
IV. WORKING TOWARDS ERADICATING SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE
WORKPLACE
A. A Civil Cause of Action Against MNCs for Sexual Abuse
Committed by their Subcontractors
After a visit to Jordan in November 2011, Rashida Manjoo,
the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,
warned Jordanian authorities about the nation’s lack of efforts

148. Ramasastry, supra note 147, at 91.
149. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) was not applicable to corporation); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding oil
corporation sued for aiding and abetting violations of human rights by Nigerian government, and corporations in general, cannot be sued for violations of
the “law of nations” under the ATCA), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 472 (2011). The
U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10–1491, 2013 WL 1628935 (U.S.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 17, 2013). The Supreme Court concluded that where there is
only a weak connection to the United States, the perpetrators of serious human rights abuses committed abroad cannot be held to account using the
ATCA. Id., at *6. However, the Supreme Court did not decide on the issue of
whether U.S. corporations can altogether be held liable under the statute for
human rights violations abroad.
150. See Engle, supra note 147, at 288.
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to address sexual abuse and harassment.151 She noted that although many individuals she interviewed did not identify these
as national problems, “it is necessary to acknowledge that sexual violence and sexual harassment occur both within and outside the family in every society.”152 Ms. Manjoo explained that,
“the fact that certain subjects might be considered taboo within
a society that largely describes itself as traditional, conservative, patriarchal and tribal might explain women’s silence with
regard to these manifestations of violence.”153
Contrary to Jordanian claims, sexual harassment is not a
purely Western occurrence. Along with India’s Vishaka decision in 1987,154 other developing nations have begun to implement laws against sexual harassment as necessary to attain
equal rights for women. In 2004, Morocco made an important
change to its Labor Code, introducing the concept of sexual
harassment in the workplace. 155 In 2009, using Vishaka as
precedent, the Bangladeshi High Court (“High Court”) issued a
decision defining sexual harassment and the steps employers
must take to protect against it.156 In its interpretation of the
nation’s constitution, the High Court considered Article 11 of
the CEDAW on equality in employment, and the CEDAW
Committee’s General Recommendation No. 19 on violence
against women.157 The High Court noted, “harrowing tales of
repression and sexual abuse of women at their workplaces, educational institutions and other Government and NonGovernmental organizations,”158 and “recognized that equality
in employment can be seriously impaired when women are subjected to gender specific violence.”159
Jordan’s apparent denial of the problem’s existence does little
to advance its women workers’ rights. By failing to address the
151. Jordan must act to end violence against women, UN rights expert says,
NEWS
CTR.
(Nov
24,
2011),
U.N.
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40507&Cr=violence%20agai
nst%20women&Cr1=#.UXG7NLXqn94.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See notes 110–13 supra and accompanying text.
155. See
CEDAW
Success
Stories,
UNIFEM,
http://www.unifem.org/cedaw30/success_stories/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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sexual harassment and abuse of female workers, Jordan is effectively in violation of its duties under the CEDAW that require it to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise.”160 Thus, Jordan is necessarily failing to exercise due diligence in ending abuses against women.161
The CEDAW Committee issued a general recommendation
addressing states’ obligations to solve the problem of violence
against women. General Recommendation No. 19 noted that
under the CEDAW states must take steps to provide the following:
(i) Effective legal measures, including penal sanctions, civil
remedies, and compensatory provisions to protect women
against all kinds of violence, including violence and abuse in
the family, sexual assault and sexual harassment in the
workplace.
(ii) Preventative measures, including public information and
education programs to change attitudes concerning the roles
and status of men and women.
(iii) Protective measures, including refuges, counseling, rehabilitation, and support services for women who are the victims
of violence or who are at risk of violence.162

In order to fulfill the positive rights propounded by the
CEDAW, Jordan must institute laws against sexual harassment and create effective and confidential avenues for complaints against employers. Without doing so and enforcing such
laws, Jordan is responsible for the actions of corporate bodies
that facilitate human rights violations against women under
the CEDAW’s Article 2(e) provisions.163 Jordan is in a position
to enforce human rights standards among those companies
privileged to do business within its borders.

160. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
162. BAD DREAMS, supra note 92, at 64.
163. See supra note 73–77 and accompanying text. See also BAD DREAMS,
supra note 92, at 64 (citing the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women—the obligation of state governments to prevent, investigate,
and punish acts of violence against women apply regardless of “whether those
acts are perpetuated by the State or by private persons.”).
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In addition to the substantive equality provisions, Article 2(c)
recognizes the “strong symbiosis”164 between the successful enforcement of laws protecting women’s rights and judicial action.165 Sections (1) and (2) of Article 15 of the CEDAW elaborate on the legal status of women in their requirement that
women receive equal status with men under the law, in the
form of equal legal capacity and equal opportunity to exercise
such rights in civil matters, such as court proceedings. 166 In
light of these provisions, it is clear that in order to achieve substantive gender equality, Jordan must institute mechanisms
for women to obtain legal redress through the courts for sexual
abuse by workplace officials. Women must be able to obtain legal redress without fear of retaliation by employers, and without fear of the social or cultural repercussions that accompany
discussion of a women’s sexual activity. To accomplish the latter, there must be a means of educating the public and working
women in particular of women’s rights under domestic and international law.
By providing women workers protection in reporting abuses
and an avenue of relief through the courts, Jordan would have
a way to gauge which factories and corporations are committing violations. It can then more efficiently monitor those entities given its limited inspection capacity.167 Moreover, corporations would be compelled to enforce human rights and the
rights of women within factories to avoid scrutiny, liability, and
bad press. But, it is not only due to “[p]overty, lack of resources, and weak governmental capacity . . . [that] developing
countries [fail to] effectively enforce labor standards. Some also
lack the political will to do so.”168 In failing to institute such
procedures to date, an underlying concern for Jordan is undoubtedly the effect of the reforms on its relationship with corporations and factory administrators.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Arnold, supra note 19, at 1380.
See CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 2(c).
See id. art. 15(1)–15(2).
See note 119 supra.
KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, LABOR STANDARDS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CAFTA,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY BRIEFS 4 (2004).
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B. The Effect of Protection Against Sexual Harassment on MNC
Activity Within Jordan
Economic growth and social development are not mutually
exclusive. “[M]arkets can flourish and sustainable economic
prosperity can be achieved only if there is a democratic and effective State that provides, through rules and institutions, an
enabling environment for private sector development and economic growth.”169 Thus, it is Jordan’s duty under the CEDAW,
and to some extent under the USFTA, to consider female migrant workers’ rights and the workplace abuses documented
against them when delineating guidelines for corporate industrial operations within Jordan’s borders. Such considerations
entail not only the rights of women, but also the status and
sustainability of MNC ventures.
Concededly, there is a significant imbalance in bargaining
power between Western conglomerates and developing countries such as Jordan.170 Jordan has thus far taken an accommodating stance on the operations of MNCs in the QIZ for fear
that companies will relocate to countries with even lower labor
and human rights standards and laxer enforcement. 171 One
QIZ manager of a large supplier plant for Victoria’s Secret,
NIKE, Calvin Klein, and Target explained that “any rises in
production costs . . . would cause Tefron [a distributor for the
above-mentioned American companies] to move operations to
Egypt since garment companies are generally only interested
in the ‘bottom-line.’”172 Female guest workers’ rights will not be
vindicated if MNCs retreat entirely from using QIZ factory labor, or are unable to achieve a profit from conducting business
in the QIZ; however, concerns about sexually violent work conditions cannot simply be ignored.
169. GUIDO BERTUCCI & ADRIANA ALBERTI, GLOBALIZATION AND THE ROLE OF
STATE: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 17 (2001), available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan006225.pdf.
170. Id. at 2 (“the present form of globalization is largely shaped by the
rules advanced by one part of the world – namely the most influential—and
these rules do not necessarily favour developing countries and countries in
transition.”).
171. See ELLIOTT, supra note 168, at 3 (“Labor ministry officials sometimes
concede in private that foreign investors threaten to go elsewhere if they
must deal with unions.”).
172. Jordan: QIZ Garment Factories: Jordanian-Israeli Business,
WWEEK.COM (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.wweek.com/portland/article-18364jordan_qiz_garment_factories_jordanian_israeli_business.html.
THE
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Most textile manufacturing plants in Jordan’s QIZs are
owned by Asian investors.173 However, these factories largely
supply products to American MNCs. Therefore, their operations are inseparable from the American MNCs’ economic ventures. The supply chain of MNCs is oftentimes highly complex,
involving contractors, subcontractors, and perhaps even further
subdivisions of labor in the subcontractor category. However,
the overall cost structure of creating and selling a garment is
set by the corporation, as are the factory codes of conduct. Addressing violations from the top down will inevitably result in
greater scrutiny and enforcement of these codes of conduct, and
lead to reduced human rights violations against women.
Though MNCs may not affirmatively assist or cause a lowerlevel employee to commit human rights violations, the MNC
may passively allow the violation to occur in order to benefit
from the coercive work conditions that result. If the company
has not actually aided and abetted a state government in committing the abuses, it will not be held responsible under principles of international law, and victims will not be able to pursue
charges against the company.174 While it cannot be said that
the corporations operating in Jordan have explicitly demanded
that state authorities maintain this status quo, the Jordanian
government is effectively accommodating and protecting
MNCs’ commercial interests in its failure to provide legal remedies for women suffering from sexual abuse in the workplace.
In addition, compared to female migrant workers, the MNCs
have far more leverage over Jordanian law-making through the
threat to remove capital from Jordan’s economy if labor costs
increase. However, even if there is no legal claim against corporations who do not act under the color of international law,
there is still the notion that corporations are morally complicit
for benefitting from human rights violations.175 Amnesty International commented that, “to accept the benefits of measures
by governments or local authorities to improve the business

173. See supra note 11.
174. BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 71, at 132.
175. See id. “Beyond law, the idea that companies are morally complicit if
they passively benefit from violations is gaining ground. The UN Global
Compact (Principle 2) warns that ‘should a corporation benefit from violations
by authorities . . . corporate complicity would be evident.’” Id.
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climate which themselves constitute violations of human
rights, makes a company party to those violations.”176
Regardless of a victims’ ability to sue an MNC under international law, the victim can still pursue a claim against Jordan
for failing to exercise due diligence in protecting her from violence at private hands.177 The best way for Jordan to discharge
its duty to protect women is to spread liability to MNCs
through civil sanctions under domestic law.178
A large part of what makes Jordan attractive to MNCs is the
lower cost structure and relaxed legal requirements for workers’ rights. 179 As noted previously, MNCs by nature of their
corporate outsourcing mechanisms are able to deflect liability
for workplace abuses to the subcontractor factories where human rights violations actually occur.180 This structure reflects
the low priority MNCs give to contracted workers and the
standard of their working conditions.181 In the garment industry, a sector historically and culturally defined as “women’s
work,” this low priority has allowed for the sexual abuse of employees that occupy a particularly vulnerable position in Jordanian society.
Individualized criminal liability for each factory manager or
supervisor may be less complex to administer than civil liability of business enterprises, but it fails to reach the underlying
infrastructure that condones violence against women as a form
of labor coercion and sex discrimination. In comparison, a system of civil remedies for victims of sexual violence in factory
settings that extends into the larger corporate infrastructure
reaches these underlying structural concerns. Thus, Jordan
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
178. See Gobert, supra note 28. “When offenders are sentenced to prison,
the government must bear the not inconsiderable expense of housing and
feeding the offender, providing a secure facility, and employing the necessary
personnel to maintain order and protect the public against escapes.” Id. In
comparison, a fine against a business entity is relatively cost-free to administer and additionally generates the capital to provide compensation to the injured worker for the human rights offense. See id.
179. DENIS G. ARNOLD & LAURA P. HARTMAN, BEYOND SWEATSHOPS: POSITIVE
DEVIANCY
AND
GLOBAL
LABOR
PRACTICES
26,
available
at
http://www.positivedeviance.org/pdf/research/ArnoldHartmanPositiveDevianc
e%5B1%5D.pdf.
180. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
181. See ARNOLD & HARTMAN, supra note 179, at 27.
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should impose joint and several liability against MNCs for the
violations of its subcontractors. The doctrine of joint employer
liability has promoted corporate accountability for the working
conditions of garment workers in the United States182 and is a
useful doctrine to promote female workers’ rights and safety up
and down the supply chain.
MNCs are in the best position to positively impact working
conditions in their QIZ supplier factories, and judicial action
against the MNCs for failing to do so will spur much needed
reform. 183 Jordan must therefore hold them accountable
through monetary civil liability for failure to monitor and enforce workplace safety standards and workers’ rights in supplier factories.
Financial penalties are necessary to incentivize MNCs to enforce their codes of conduct in good faith to prevent human
rights abuses against women in supplier factories. “Whereas
182. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003). In Zheng,
the plaintiffs were all employed by a garment factory that sewed apparel as a
subcontractor to various clothing manufacturers, including Liberty Apparel
(“Liberty”). The workers brought an action for wage theft under both the Fair
Labor Standards Act and state law against both the garment factory and Liberty, claiming that most of their work had been performed for Liberty. Id. at
63–64. The case proceeded against Liberty when the supplier factory was no
longer a viable defendant. Id. at 64. Although Liberty had never directly employed the garment workers, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied its
motion for summary judgment and remanded to decide whether Liberty had
functional control of the garment workers. Id. at 69. The pertinent factors
included: (1) whether the corporation’s premises and equipment were used for
the plaintiffs’ work; (2) whether the contractor company had “a business that
could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint employer to another;” (3)
the extent to which plaintiffs performed a discrete line item job integral to
the corporation’s process of production; (4) whether responsibility under the
contracts “could pass from one subcontractor to another without material
changes;” (5) the degree to which the Liberty Defendants or their agents supervised plaintiffs’ work; and (6) whether plaintiffs worked exclusively or
predominantly for the defendant corporation. Id. at 72.
183. See generally Larry Cata Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise
of Efficient Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislature, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739 (2007). The Global Compact suggests that
MNCs have the authority to “enact, within their sphere of influence, a set of
core values in the areas of human rights, labour standards, the environment,
and anti-corruption.” Id. at 1754–55. Since QIZ factories supplying to MNCs
are contractually bound by MNC supplier standards, MNCs are better able to
enforce those norms through inspection, audit, sanctions, and possible contract termination for failure to comply. Id. at 1755.
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the greatest threat to an individual may be the loss of liberty,
the greatest threat to a company is the loss of profitability. Because such a loss strikes at the essential purpose of the company, a fine holds the potential to be an effective deterrent.”184
The negative publicity associated with a court decision or colorable claim against a corporation is likely to cause reputational harm that most corporations will try to avoid in the interest
of protecting their public image and maintaining their stock
prices.185 Judicial action and state sanctions against the corporation would spur the adoption of new corporate policies and
enforcement practices for supplier plants that are designed to
prevent future human rights violations. 186 Thus, reforms in
MNC internal monitoring and enforcement practices will not
only help to reduce violence against female workers, but will
also help to reduce the concern on the part of MNC shareholders that their investments will suffer losses, either through actual legal liability, or through negative media attention.
While imposing sexual harassment penalties may at first deter MNCs due to the increased liability costs for operating factories in the QIZ, the law will lead to overall healthy business
practices and long-term profitability. Safe and just work environments enhance satisfaction and productivity of workers.
They also lead to greater customer satisfaction and loyalty, and
improved corporate character, thus promoting financial stability in the long-term. Good corporate reputation may also create
lower production costs over time, as supplier plants will prefer
to work with such businesses. In addition, safe and healthy
work environments “enhance the preference satisfaction of employees and shareholders who do not wish to benefit from working conditions and wages that they regard as unjustly exploitative . . . [and] of consumers who do not wish to benefit from
working conditions and wages that they regard as ethically
wrong.” 187 Increased productivity and employee loyalty may
ultimately offset the cost of the implementing mechanisms that
provide greater protection to female QIZ workers’ basic rights
under the CEDAW.

184. Gobert, supra note 28.
185. See ANCA IULIA POP, CRIMINAL LIABILITY
COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 38 (2006).
186. See id.
187. See ARNOLD & HARTMAN, supra note 179, at 32.
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CONCLUSION
Sexual abuse and harassment in the workplace are critical
problems in Jordan’s QIZ. The prevalence of abuse against migrant women in factory settings points to persistent and systemic discrimination against women in society. The discrimination encountered by women in the QIZ is multiplied after considering the intersectionality of their vulnerabilities. The Jordanian government must bear this in mind if it truly seeks
gender equality in the workplace, as the CEDAW requires. By
instituting laws against sexual harassment, making marginalized women in the QIZ aware of their rights, and giving such
women a cause of action in a court of law, Jordan can uplift
both the status of women and encourage fair labor practices
that are likely to increase the profitability of MNCs operating
in the region. A cause of action must exist both criminally
against individual offenders, as well as civilly against higher
corporate bodies. The latter will ensure that a commitment to
human rights in the workplace trickles down to supplier plants
where violations, such as the ones at Classic, take place.
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